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REMEDIES-THE ApPEARANCE OF ACCESS: DEAF DEFENDANTS 
AND THE MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIARy-JUSTICE? 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Hypothetical 
John SandovaP is an indigent nineteen-year-old DeaP man ac­
cused of sexual assault on a minor. He has a court-appointed de­
fense attorney. He has been arrested and arraigned and is being 
held without bail pending trial. He has been in jail for two years. 
John's prolonged stay in jail is partly the result of the seven times 
his proceedings have been continued due to the lack of legally qual­
ified ASLlEnglish interpreters3 in the court. Each time a motion 
hearing or status conference is continued for lack of an interpreter, 
it is a month or more before it can be rescheduled. John's attorney 
has an important strategy though, which precludes him from com­
plaining about the lack of a speedy trial. He is trying to get John's 
confession suppressed because it was made to police officers with­
out a qualified interpreter present-in violation of the Massachu­
setts Interpreter Law.4 Each time the proceedings are continued, 
his point is made loud and clear for the judge that no justice can be 
meted out in this case without the presence of a legally qualified 
ASLlEnglish interpreter. The judge becomes increasingly frus­
trated throughout the two years, often shouting out on record, 
"Isn't there anything we can do to secure an interpreter for these 
proceedings? " 
1. Although John Sandoval is a fictional person, his story is a composite of true 
stories related to the author by Deaf defendants, the author's own experiences, and 
several accounts related to the author by Kellie Hickey, Legal Referral Specialist at the 
Massachusetts Comm'n for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing (MCDHH). All identifying 
information has been removed. 
2. "Deaf' is capitalized here because it refers to people who not only have hear­
ing loss, but who also identify as members of the Deaf community, a linguistic and 
cultural minority. When referring to those people with hearing loss who do not identify 
as members of the Deaf community, but rather who live, socialize, and work completely 
in the non-Deaf world, "deaf" will be used. 
3. The term ASL refers to "American Sign Language." For further definition and 
discussion, see infra Part I.C 
4. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004); see infra note 5. 
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With an interpreter present the judge finally grants the motion 
to suppress.s He binds the interpreter over for trial and the case 
goes forward. But without John's confession the prosecution's case 
is weak and John is acquitted. Meanwhile, because the judge has 
bound the interpreter over for the two day trial, four other court 
proceedings that the interpreter was scheduled for must be 
continued. 
John's lawyer immediately files a multi-party civil suit against 
the Massachusetts Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing 
(MCDHH) and the Justices of the Superior Court of Hampden 
County for violation of the Interpreter Law. The complaint also 
alleges violations of the rights of John and several other Deaf de­
fendants, under article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution, to a 
speedy trial, to be present for the proceedings against them, to con­
front witnesses against them, and to meaningful access to counse1.6 
The suit also alleges violations of the Deaf defendants' due process 
rights. 
B. The Problem 
In 1985, the Massachusetts legislature charged MCDHH with a 
host of mandates, including providing and ensuring the provision of 
qualified ASLIEnglish interpreters for court proceedings.7 
MCDHH has not met its burden as charged by the Commonwealth, 
which has contributed to an interpreter shortage.8 The question is 
5. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A. The Interpreter Law states in pertinent part: 
Whenever a deaf or hearing-impaired person is arrested for an alleged 
violation of a criminal law, including a local ordinance, the arresting officer 
shall procure and arrange payment for a qualified interpreter to assist such 
person regarding any interrogation, warning, notification of rights, or taking of 
a statement. No answer, statement, or admission, written or oral, made by a 
deaf or hearing-impaired person in response to any question by a law enforce­
ment officer or any prosecutor, in his official capacity, in any criminal proceed­
ing may be used against such deaf or hearing-impaired person unless such 
statement was made or elicited through a qualified interpreter and was made 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently or, in the case of waiver of interpreter, 
unless the court makes a special finding that any statement made by such deaf 
or hearing-impaired person was made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
6. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12 ("No subject shall be held to answer for any crimes 
of offence, until the same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally, described to 
him ...."). Unless otherwise stated, "constitution" refers to the Massachusetts Consti­
tution throughout this Note. 
7. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 194 (2004). 
8. See ELIZA ANDERSON, MASS. HUMAN SERVS. COAL., PEOPLE FIRST: DISABIL. 
ITY ANALYSIS OF THE STATE BUDGET 89-90 (2005), available at http://www.mass.gov/ 
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what can be done to pressure the legislature into properly funding 
MCDHH so that it can effectively recruit and train interpreters for 
the courts. This Note argues that the Supreme Judicial Court has 
two choices: it can do here what it did in Lavallee v. Justices in the 
Hampden Superior Court,9 and release Deaf defendants who do not 
have access to counsel due to the lack of access to qualified inter­
preters. lO In the alternative, the court can address this problem 
through a writ of mandamus ordering MCDHH to recruit, train, 
and retain an adequate number of interpreters qualified to work in 
court and legal settings. In response, MCDHH-not funded for an 
undertaking of such magnitude-will necessarily approach the leg­
islature for permanent funding earmarked for legal interpreter 
training. 
This Note will first argue that Deaf defendants are currently in 
the same bind that indigent non-Deaf defendants were in when 
Lavallee was decided and, as such, should be freed within a reason­
able time if no interpreters are available. Second, chapter 211, sec­
tion 3 of the Massachusetts General Laws authorizes the court to 
issue a mandamus under extraordinary circumstances.ll This Note 
will therefore argue that the severe shortage of qualified interpret­
ers available to work in the courts, which precludes Deaf defend­
ants from legally and meaningfully participating in the proceedings 
against them, is an appropriately extraordinary circumstance to 
warrant a writ of mandamus. Both measures would put pressure on 
the legislature to appropriate funds to ensure that an adequate 
mddc/documents/people_firsChlfy06.pdf (identifying the shortage of legal interpreters, 
stating that "[t]he shortage is hampering the Commission's ability to function and indi­
viduals' capacity to access basic legal, emergency and human services supports"); MASS. 
HUMAN SERVS. COAL., PEOPLE FIRST: WHAT MASSACHUSETTS DOES FOR PEOPLE 
WITH DISABILITIES 38 (2005) [hereinafter PEOPLE FIRST], available at http://www.mass. 
gov/mddc/documents/people_first_h2fy06.pdf (identifying the severe shortage of gener­
alist ASUEnglish interpreters). This author is a nationally certified ASLlEnglish inter­
preter qualified by MCDHH to work in court and legal settings. She has firsthand, 
intimate knowledge of the state of interpreter services in Massachusetts. Statistics are 
not always available, despite the best efforts of this author to obtain them. Some anec­
dotal evidence will be used in this Note, although every effort has been made to cite 
authority where possible. 
9. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 
2004). 
10. Id. at 912 (ordering the release of indigent defendants not assigned counsel 
after seven days). "[T]he principle[] of procedural due process ... include[s] the right 
to be heard, which necessarily includes the right to be heard by counsel." Id. at 902 
(citing Commonwealth v. Torres, 806 N.E.2d 895, 897 (Mass. 2004». 
11. See infra Part II.E.2; see also MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 211, § 3 (2004). 
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number of interpreters are recruited, trained, and paid to work in 
court and legal settings. 
Part I of this Note will outline a brief history of the circum­
stances in Massachusetts that led to the current shortage of quali­
fied court and legal interpreters. Part I will also describe the Deaf 
community, its language (ASL), culture, traditions, and norms. Fi­
nally, Part I will examine relevant case law. Part II argues that, 
based on analogous case law, the solution to the interpreter 
shortage should be the release of Deaf defendants who cannot be 
provided interpreters in a timely fashion or, alternatively, the issu­
ance of mandamus. The judiciary can and should intervene when 
the civil rights of a group of individuals are being violated by the 
policies of inaction, and sometimes overt obstruction, promulgated 
by the agency charged with their protection. 
I. BACKGROUND 
There is a crisis-level shortage of qualified ASLIEnglish inter­
preters available to work in the courts in Massachusetts.12 The lack 
of interpreters for Deaf defendants in the courts violates both state 
statutes and the Massachusetts Constitution.13 The Supreme Judi­
cial Court of Massachusetts has made it clear that such deprivation 
of defendants' rights to counsel and to access the proceedings 
against them is impermissible.14 Not only are Deaf defendants' 
rights violated by the shortage of interpreters, but the judiciary's 
ability to mete out justice is also stymied. 
12. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 89-90 (identifying the shortage of legal interpret­
ers, stating "[t]he shortage is hampering the Commission's ability to function and indi­
viduals' capacity to access basic legal, emergency and human services supports"). 
13. See id.; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12. Although it will become clear throughout 
this Note that Deaf defendants' federal constitutional rights are also implicated, other 
articles have addressed that issue already. Therefore, this Note only discusses the Mas­
sachusetts justice system. See, e.g., Michele-Lee Berko, Comment, Preserving the Sixth 
Amendment Rights of the Deaf Criminal Defendant, 97 DICK. L. REV. 101 (1992); Greg­
ory G. Sarno, Annotation, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Use or Nonuse Of Inter­
preter at Prosecution of Hearing-Impaired Defendant, 86 A.L.R. 4TH 698 (2007); Jo 
Anne Simon, The Use of Interpreters for the Deaf and the Legal Community's Obliga­
tion to Comply with the ADA, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 155 (1994); Jamie McAlister, Deaf and 
Hard-of-Hearing Criminal Defendants: How You Gonna Get Justice if You Can't Talk to 
the Judge?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 163 (1994); Attorneys, Deaf Clients and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 2004-JAN W. VA. LAW. 30; Michele LaVigne & McCay Vernon, An 
Interpreter Isn't Enough: Deafness, Language, and Due Process, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 843. 
14. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d 895. 
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A. The Scope of the Problem and the Supporting Statistics 
Deaf defendants in the United States require the use of ASLI 
English interpreters in legal proceedings; without interpreters, Deaf 
defendants would not be able to exercise their Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution. IS Such interpreters 
must be specially trained and highly skilled to work in court and 
legal settings. The Massachusetts legislature recognized these 
needs when it passed and later amended the Interpreter Law-a 
law distinct from spoken language statutes-that exclusively pro­
tects the communication access rights of Deaf people in the 
courts.16 The legislature recognized that unless this standard is met, 
Deaf defendants' constitutional rights will be violatedP 
The legislature further recognized the unique communication 
access needs of the Deaf community by establishing MCDHH and 
charging it with the duties of both qualifying interpreters and refer­
ring appropriate interpreters to court and legal assignments. I8 
However, there are not nearly enough interpreters who are quali­
fied to work in court and legal settings to meet the needs of Deaf 
defendants,I9 let alone all the other Deaf parties who need inter­
preters for their proceedings.20 For example, Deaf people who 
have been arrested sit in jail sometimes for days without under­
standing what is happening to them or why they were arrested be­
cause of the length of time it takes to obtain the services of an 
interpreter. Sometimes, as in the hypothetical case of John Sando­
val, their time in jail is much longer. Such deprivation of freedom 
violates part I, article 12, of the Massachusetts Constitution, which 
guarantees a defendant's right to due process, to understand the 
15. For a comprehensive examination of the nexus between the provision of qual­
ified ASLIEnglish interpreters for Deaf defendants and their constitutional rights, see 
Berko, supra note 13; Sarno, supra note 13; Simon, supra note 13; McAlister, supra 
note 13; Attorneys, Deaf Clients and the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 13; 
LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 13. 
16. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004). 
17. Id.; see also MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12 ("No subject shall be held to answer 
for any crimes of offence, until the same is fully and plainly, substantially and formally, 
described to him ...."). 
18. An Act Establishing a Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, ch. 
716,1985 Mass. Acts 1106 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 191-199 
(2004». 
19. Although the shortage affects Deaf people in all legal settings, the focus of 
this Note is solely on Deaf defendants. 
20. Telephone Interview with KeIlie Hickey, Statewide Court and Legal Inter­
preter Referral Specialist, Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing, in 
Dorchester, Mass. (Oct. 21, 2005). 
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charges against him or her, and to counsel.21 In order to comforta­
bly fill the existing interpreter requests,22 which do not include jury 
duty,23 MCDHH would need to more than double its pool of quali­
21. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12. Article 12 states in pertinent part, "No subject 
shall be held to answer for any crimes of offence, until the same is fully and plainly, 
substantially and formally, described to him." Id. It goes on to track the due process, 
jury of one's peers, right to face witnesses, and right to remain silent language of the 
U.S. Constitution, which states "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
22. From January 2004 through December 2004 there were 1274 official requests 
for interpreters for court or legal assignments in Massachusetts. Statistics compiled by 
Kellie Hickey, Statewide Court and Legal Interpreter Referral Specialist, Mass. 
Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing, in Dorchester, Mass. (Apr. 30, 2007) (on file 
with author). Of these requests, 62 were withdrawn by the requestor (this could be for 
reasons such as the case being settled or the defendant pleading out, but it could also be 
because the referral specialist could predict that no interpreter would be available), and 
102 requests were cancelled (this could be due to attorney or witness illness, miss­
cheduling, or other reasons). Id. Of the 1274 official requests, only 847 were filled. Id. 
Ms. Hickey forewarned the author that because she is the one person holding every­
one's schedules and doing legal referral for the whole state, not all of the unfilled as­
signments are reflected in these statistics. She is able to see when it will be impossible 
to fill requests based on the number of requests she has already filled for a specific time 
period and persuade court clerks to get a continuance for those conflicting dates. She 
informed the author that there are "many more" continuances, or technically unfilled 
requests, that are not reflected in the above mentioned statistics. E-mail from Kellie 
Hickey, Statewide Court & Legal Interpreter Referral Specialist, Mass. Comm'n for the 
Deaf & Hard of Hearing, in Dorchester, Mass., to author (Sept. 1,2005) (on file with 
author). Because not all of the continuances are reflected in these numbers, the actual 
fill rate is probably considerably lower. Id. Of the total 1274 requests, 369 were for two 
or more interpreters. Statistics compiled by Kellie Hickey, supra. Because there are so 
few interpreters available, the requests requiring two or more interpreters are especially 
difficult to fill. Id. Every time these requests are made, the ability of the referral spe­
cialist to fill them goes down. Telephone Interview with Kellie Hickey, supra note 20. 
23. MCDHH currently has a moratorium on referring interpreters for Deaf peo­
ple selected for jury duty. Form Letter from Kellie Hickey, Statewide Court & Legal 
Interpreter Referral Specialist, Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing, to 
members of the Deaf community seeking to participate in jury duty (Sept. 1,2005) (on 
file with author). The policy is unwritten, but the letter, prepared by Kellie Hickey 
which, is sent to Deaf people who want to participate when called for jury duty reads, in 
pertinent part: 
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fied interpreters.24 In fact, under the current system, the referral 
specialist at MCDHH, seeing that no interpreters will be available, 
often convinces court clerks to reschedule proceedings according to 
when interpreters will be available.25 Thus, many requests are di­
verted to future dates without ever being officially logged as "un­
filled. "26 To fully meet the needs of Deaf people involved in the 
legal system, the number of interpreters would probably have to 
increase threefold.27 
This crisis-level shortage of interpreters qualified to work in 
court and legal settings is not new. The pool of qualified interpret­
ers has been more or less the same for thirty years.28 If anything, 
because the pool of interpreters is static but the number of requests 
Currently requests for Jury Duty in Massachusetts are unfilled. Although 
we are aware of the public outcry from members of the Deaf community want­
ing to perform their civic duty, there are many factors that continue [to] block 
communication access at this time. 
In Massachusetts, there exist only a handful of legally qualified sign lan­
guage interpreters. . .. The demand is so high for these individuals, that often 
times they are booked months in advance. Any jury assignment would require 
at least two interpreters ... if not more. With so few qualified people in the 
state, we must prioritize our resources by scheduling interpreters ... for daily 
court proceedings (i.e. arraignments, pretrials, trials) and other out of court 
legal requests (i.e. arrests, attorney client meetings, depositions). 
There has been an agreement between MCDHH and AOTClJury Com­
missioners office that when we receive the requests for jury duty, they are 
postponed for at least a year due [to] the lack of interpreters .... Until there 
is an increase in legally qualified interpreters ... in Massachusetts, we do not 
foresee a change in filling these requests. 
Id. 
24. As of the writing of this Note, there are thirteen ASUEnglish interpreters 
deemed qualified to work in the Massachusetts courts who actually reside and work in 
the Commonwealth. Telephone Interview with Kellie Hickey, supra note 20. Of those 
thirteen interpreters, the approximate equivalent of 4.5 interpreters are willing and able 
to accept court assignments on a consistent, full-time basis. [d. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. This estimate is based on the professional opinion of Kellie Hickey, Statewide 
Court & Legal Interpreter Referral Specialist, Massachusetts Comm'n for the Deaf & 
Hard of Hearing. Id. 
28. Interview with Joan Wattman, Massachusetts court & legal interpreter since 
1976, in Plainfield, Mass. (Aug. 5, 2005). 
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continues to rise,29 the crisis is worse now than it was even ten years 
ago.30 
B. 	 The History and Laws that Led to the Ongoing Interpreter 
Crisis 
"Disability advocates have been very successful in using stat­
utes and legislative action, rather than court cases, to address equal 
protection by building on the traditional government function of 
social welfare. "31 Before the Americans with Disabilities Act,32 or 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,33 were passed, Massa­
chusetts led other states in passing the critically important Inter­
preter Law, which applies only to Deaf people, in 1971.34 The text 
of the original law, which has since been amended,35 provided, in 
relevant part: 
29. Requests continue to rise because of the passage of the Americans with Disa­
bilities Act (ADA) and an increased level of judicial awareness of its mandates, 
MCDHH's educational presentations to the courts and law enforcement about courts' 
duties to Deaf parties, and the rising visibility of interpreters in general. See Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.c. § 12101 (2000). Tennessee v. Lane was the seminal case 
determining that all qualified people with disabilities have a right to unhindered access 
to the courts. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). The case involved a disabled 
man who was a criminal defendant in Tennessee. Id. at 513-14. Due to the lack of 
wheelchair access at his local courthouse, he was forced to crawl up the courthouse 
stairs to appear at his proceeding. Id. When the proceeding was continued, he refused 
to crawl up the stairs again or allow the court's personnel to carry him on the subse~ 
quent date. Id. at 514. He sued the state of Tennessee under Title II of the ADA, 
which prohibits discrimination against qualified people with disabilities with respect to 
public services. Id. at 513. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Title II 
was appropriately exercised by Congress as part of its enforcement power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to cases implicating the fundamental right of a per­
son to access the courts. Id. The Court held that it was indeed a valid exercise of 
Congress's enforcement power and that Title II governs in cases concerning qualified 
people with disabilities paving access to the courts. Id. at 533-34. 
30. 	 Interview with Joan Wattman, supra note 28. 
31. Sarah S. Geer, When "Equal" Means "Unequal"-And Other Legal Conun­
drums for the Deaf Community, in LANGUAGE AND THE LAW IN DEAF COMMUNITIES 
82, 118-19 (Ceil Lucas, ed. 2003). 
32. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.c. § 12101 (prohibiting discrimina­
tion against qualified people with disabilities in employment and state and public ac­
commodations, including access to courts). 
33. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000)) (prohibiting discrimination against people with dis­
abilities by entities receiving federal funding and specifically requiring the use of quali­
fied interpreters for Deaf people). 
34. Act of June 29, 1971, ch. 459, 1971 Mass. Acts 306 (codified as amended at 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004)) (providing for the appointment of interpreters 
for Deaf people in Superior Court). 
35. 	 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004). 
;0',
.' 
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In any proceeding in the superior court to which a deaf person is 
a party or a witness, the presiding justice shall appoint a qualified 
interpreter to interpret the proceedings for such person, unless 
such person waives in writing the appointment of such inter­
preter. For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed 
to be deaf if he has a physical handicap which prevents him from 
speaking or from hearing fully.36 
Then, in 1974, just after the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 went into 
effect, the Massachusetts legislature passed the law establishing the 
Massachusetts Office on Deafness (MOD), to be housed under the 
auspices of the Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission.37 The 
purpose of establishing the MOD was to address the growing con­
cern that Deaf people's unique communication access needs were 
not being addressed by the newly burgeoning disability-rights 
movement, and that as such, Deaf people were falling through the 
cracks on every front, as well as suffering discrimination unique to 
their population.38 
It was not until 1978 that the federal government passed the 
Federal Court Interpreters Act39 and many states followed suit. 
The purpose of this law was to protect the constitutional rights of 
Deaf people and others who spoke languages other than English in 
court and legal proceedings.40 The public and its elected represent­
atives were beginning to understand that without interpretation, 
Deaf people and people who spoke languages other than English 
were not able to meaningfully participate in any legal proceeding.41 
They were realizing that 
too often ... constitutional mandates [we]re violated out of igno­
rance and fear. Ignorance on the part of the criminal justice sys­
tem because [it] d[id] not know the actual consequences of 
deafness ... and fear ... because the system d[id] not understand 
deaf persons and deaf persons do not understand the system.42 
,I~·t. 
36. Act Providing for the Appointment of Interpreters for the Deaf in Court Pro­
ceedings, ch. 459, 1971 Mass. Acts 306. 
37. An Act Establishing an Office of Deafness in the Massachusetts Rehabilita­
tion Commission, ch. 805, 1974 Mass. Acts 804, repealed by An Act Establishing a Com­
mission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, ch. 716, § 1, 1985 Mass. Acts 1106. 
38. H.R. 5679, 168th Gen. Ct., 2d. Ann. Sess., § 1(1)-(3) (Mass. 1974). 
39. Court Interpreters Act, Pub. L. No. 95-539, 92 Stat. 2040 (1978) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.c. § 1827 (2000». 
40. Rob Hoopes, Trampling Miranda: Interrogating Deaf Suspects, in LANGUAGE 
AND THE LAW IN DEAF COMMUNITIES, supra note 31, at 21, 28. 
41. Id. 
42. McAlister, supra note 13, at 163-64. 
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But Massachusetts was at the forefront, leading the way by passing 
the Interpreter Law and the laws establishing the MOD.43 
There is little legislative history available to describe what hap­
pened in Massachusetts in the 1970s that led to the passage of these 
vital state laws. But it is clear from subsequent events that between 
1974 and 1985 Deaf people came together in Massachusetts to 
lobby for their communication access rights.44 In June of 1985, the 
Task Force on Deafness submitted its official report to the Secre­
tary of the Executive Office of Human Services.45 The Task Force 
stressed the Deaf community's pressing need for an independent 
agency to protect and ensure its rights.46 It proposed the formation 
of MCDHH,47 and less than a year later, by executive order of 
then-Governor Michael Dukakis, the agency was established.48 
MCDHH was a new agency, separate from the Massachusetts Re­
habilitation Commission, with its own budget and newly appointed 
Deaf commissioner, Barbara Jean Wood.49 
Among other tasks, the legislature charged MCDHH with 
promulgating and coordinating public policy, advocating for the 
needs of Deaf people in the Commonwealth, providing and ensur­
ing the provision of interpreter services, ensuring the accessibility 
and quality of existing services, and recommending new services to 
the Governor as needed.50 The current section of the law entitled 
"Functions of Commission" states that MCDHH "shall serve as the 
principal agency of the commonwealth, on behalf of deaf and hard 
of hearing persons."51 Further, MCDHH explains in its mission 
statement: 
43. An Act Providing for Interpreters for the Deaf in Court Proceedings, ch. 459, 
1971 Mass. Acts 306 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (1971»; An Act 
Establishing an Office of Deafness in the Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission, ch. 
805, 1974 Mass. Acts 804, repealed by An Act Establishing a Commission for the Deaf 
and Hard of Hearing, ch. 716, § 1, 1985 Mass. Acts 1106 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 6, §§ 191-199 (1985». 
44. TASK FORCE ON DEAFNESS, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF 
THE TASK FORCE ON DEAFNESS (1985). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 14. 
47. Id. 
48. Agency Established for the Hearing Disabled, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1986, at 
35, available at 1986 WLNR 279392 (Westlaw). 
49. Jean Dietz, Head of Deaf Commission Sworn In: Silent Applause Greets New 
Leader, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 1986, at 25, available at 1986 WLNR 278258 
(Westiaw). 
50. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 191-199 (2004). 
51. Id. § 194. 
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All functions and services are carried out in order to enable deaf 
and hard of hearing individuals to have access to information, 
services, education, and opportunities which will be equal to 
those of able-bodied people who hear and which will enable each 
deaf and hard of hearing individual to live productively and inde­
pendently while assuming fullest responsibilities as a citizen.52 
After MCDHH was established, the legislature amended the 
Interpreter Law several times, expanding its reach and charging 
MCDHH with ever more responsibility in protecting the communi­
cation access rights of Deaf people. The current version of the In­
terpreter Law provides, in pertinent part: 
In any proceeding in any court in which a deaf . . . person is a 
party or a witness, or proceeding involves a juvenile whose par­
ent, or parents, is deaf ... or in any proceeding before an execu­
tive or legislative board . . . or other body of the state ... such 
court or body shall appoint a qualified interpreter to interpret the 
proceedings, unless such deaf ... person knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently waives, in writing the appointment of such inter­
preter.... In no event shall the failure of the deaf . .. person to 
request an interpreter be deemed a waiver of such appointment. 
. . . . In any criminal proceeding wherein counsel has been 
appointed to represent an indigent defendant, the court shall also 
appoint a qualified interpreter for such defendant, whenever such 
defendant is deaf . .. to assist in communication with counsel in 
all phases of the preparation and presentation of the case. 
"Qualified interpreter" ... an interpreter shall be deemed 
qualified . .. by the Office of Deafness . . . . Said office of deaf­
ness shall coordinate all requests for qualified interpreters and 
shall maintain a list of all such interpreters from which it shall fill 
such requests.53 
Not only did the legislature expand the law from its original form to 
include all legal proceedings, not just superior court proceedings, as 
was provided in the 1971 version,54 but it also designated MCDHH 
as the only entity empowered to determine interpreters' qualifica­
52. Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing, Vision and Mission State­
ment, http://www.mass.gov/mcdhh (follow the "Vision and Mission Statement" hyper­
link) (last visited May 9, 2007). 
53. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004) (emphasis added). The Office on 
Deafness is now called MCDHH, but the law has not been changed to reflect this. 
54. Act Providing for the Appointment of Interpreters For the Deaf in Court 
Proceedings, ch. 459, 1971 Mass. Acts 306. 
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tions for court and legal interpreting assignments.55 Further, it 
mandated that MCDHH would become the sole entity that would 
maintain the list of qualified interpreters and refer them on re­
quest.56 This, in effect, deprived the court of its ability to select and 
hire interpreters itself, giving MCDHH that power instead.57 In­
deed, for a judge or an attorney to do her own interpreter referral 
would be a violation of Massachusetts law. 58 
C. 	 ASL is a Complete and Separate Language from English and 
Deaf People Often Are Not Fluent Users of English 
Courts do not necessarily understand why ASLlEnglish inter­
preters are so important to Deaf people's access to the courtS.59 
Importantly, ASL is a complete and rich language, completely sepa­
rate from English, with its own vocabulary, grammar, and syntax.60 
ASL is in no way dependent on spoken or written English, which is 
linear, but instead is a visual/gestural language communicated in 
space and perceived through the eyes; there is no written form.61 
People who identify as part of the Deaf community use ASL as 
their primary mode of communication.62 In addition to using a dif­
ferent language than the mainstream popUlation, Deaf people are 
members of a unique and separate culture.63 This creates an addi­
tionallayer of complexity for Deaf people, because "[d]ifferences in 
language go hand in hand with differences in culture, since lan­
guage is an integral part of culture."64 According to the most re­
cent demographic information compiled and analyzed by MCDHH, 
55. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A. 
56. 	 Id. 
57. 	 Id. 
58. Id.; An Act Establishing a Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, ch. 
716,1985 Mass. Acts 1106-1107 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 194 (1985» (stat ­
ing that MCDHH is the only entity allowed to refer interpreters to court and legal 
settings). 
59. SUBCOMM. ON COURT INTERPRETERS, COMM. ON FAIRNESS & EQUAL Ac­
CESS TO JUSTICE, A REPORT ON INTERPRETER SERVICES IN THE VERMONT COURTS 2, 6 
(2004) available at http://www.vermontjudiciary.orgiLibraryIPDF/resources/Rpts/ 
interrpt.pdf. 
60. 	 HARLAN LANE, WHEN THE MIND HEARS 213 (Vintage Books 1989) (1984). 
61. Id. at 212-13; see also Nat'l Inst. on Deafness & Other Communications Dis­
orders, American Sign Language, http://www.nicdc.nih.gov/health/hearinglasl.asp (last 
visited May 9, 2007). 
62. CHARLOTTE BAKER & CAROL PADDEN, AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE: A 
LOOK AT ITs HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND COMMUNITY 3 (1978). 
63. 	 Id. 
64. Roger W. Shuy, The Language Problems ofMinorities in the Legal Setting, in 
LANGUAGE AND THE LAW IN DEAF COMMUNITIES, supra note 31, at 1. 
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there are approximately 13,300 culturally Deaf people (users of 
ASL) in Massachusetts.65 
In addition to the fact that ASL is a separate language from 
English, the pervasive problem of poor education in the United 
States has led to many Deaf people never learning English as a sec­
ond language.66 Most Deaf adults have a fourth grade reading 
leve1.67 The Miranda warning is supposedly written at an eighth 
grade level,68 although there is not consensus in the field of ASLI 
English interpreters that this is SO.69 Regardless, most Deaf adults, 
because of their reading level, do not have access to the warning 
through spoken or written English. Further, there is a pervasive 
misconception that all Deaf people can speak or at least speech­
read (lip-read), and if they profess not to be able to, then they are 
just being lazy or uncooperative, or worse, that they are trying to 
run a scam on the people around them who can hear (hereinafter 
"hearing people")Jo However, speech-reading is a complex and in­
65. Mass. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard 
of Hearing, Demographic Information on People Who are Deaf or Hard of Hearing, 
http://www.mass.gov/mcdhh (follow the "Demographic Information on People Who 
Are Deaf or Hard of Hearing" hyperlink) (last visited May 9, 2007). 
66. For a comprehensive examination of the factors leading to Deaf people's lack 
of English literacy, see generally Annabelle Dyer et aI., Predictors of Reading Delay in 
Deaf Adolescents: The Relative Contributions of Rapid Automatized Naming Speed and 
Phonological Awareness and Decoding, 8 J. DEAF STUD. & DEAF EDUe. 215 (2003), 
available at http://jdsde.oxfordjournals.orglcgi/reprint/8/3/215.pdf; HAROLD A. JOHN­
SON, U.S. DEAF EDUCATION TEACHER PREPARATION PROGRAMS: A LOOK AT THE 
PRESENT AND A VISION FOR THE FUTURE (2003), available at http://www.coe.ufl.edul 
copsse/docs/IB-9/1IIB-9.pdf. 
67. Dr. Jane Kelleher Fernandes, Deaf Education Today: The Status Quo, http:// 
clerccenter.gallaudet.edulProducts/Sharing-Ideas/deafedltsq.html (last visited May 9, 
2007) ("Frank Bowe (1991) in Approaching Equality reiterated that deaf children seem 
to reach a plateau at third grade reading comprehension levels."). In this Note, the 
author specifically avoids using the word "illiterate," because although many Deaf 
adults are not fluent in English, most Deaf users of ASL are fluent and fully literate in 
ASL. Their culture is replete with ASL poetry, storytelling, and literature, with which 
most Deaf adults are familiar and adept. See generally McAlister, supra note 13. 
68. Sy DUBOW ET AL., LEGAL RIGHTS: THE GUIDE FOR DEAF AND HARD OF 
HEARING PEOPLE 176 (5th ed. 2000). 
69. Professional discussion with legal interpreters at the Iron Sharpens Iron Con­
ference for Legal Interpreters in Atlanta, Georgia, in May 2004. The issue of whether 
the Miranda warning is written at the eighth grade level was discussed but not resolved 
at the court and legal interpreters training offered by AOTC and MCDHH, if the fall of 
2000. See also AOTC AND MCDHH: THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM WITH EMPHASIS 
ON THE MASSACHUSETTS COURT SYSTEM FOR INTERPRETERS SERVING DEAF AND 
HARD OF HEARING INDIVIDUALS (Lewan a Clark ed., 2000) (training manual on file 
with author). 
70. See generally HARLAN LANE, THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING THE 
DEAF COMMUNITY (Vintage Books 1993) (1992); Los Angeles Comm'n on Assaults 
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accurate art.?1 Only approximately 30 percent of speech sounds are 
visible on the lips, the rest being formed in the mouth and throat.?2 
Even the best lip-reader, under the perfect set of environmental 
circumstances (with optimal lighting, no visual distractions, a calm 
emotional state, and no obstructions to the speaker's mouth or 
face), can only understand about 30 percent of verbal speech.73 As 
author Beryl Lieff Benderly notes, "Few things so easily remove a 
person from the normal life of society as a loss of hearing. The 
person who cannot hear is a permanent foreigner in the country of 
speech."74 
D. 	 The Need for ASUEnglish Interpreters and the Process of 
Qualifying Them 
1. The Qualification of Interpreters 
The Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, Inc. (RID, Inc.) was 
established in 1964.75 It was incorporated in 1972,76 when it estab­
lished a national testing system, creating professional standards for 
ASLIEnglish interpreters in the United States.?7 In addition to de­
veloping a generalist test for certifying interpreters to work in most 
settings, RID, Inc. also developed a special certificate for interpret­
ers desiring to work in court and legal settings, the Specialist Certif­
icate: Legal (SC:L).78 This test is still used today by many states to 
Against Women, Understanding Deafness, http://www.lacaaw.org/deaffaq.html (last vis­
ited May 9, 2007); Off. for Disability Issues (New Zealand), History, http://www.odi. 
govt.nz/what-we-do/nzsl-history.html (last visited May 9, 2007); WILLIAM E. HEWITT, 
COURT INTERPRETATION: MODEL GUIDE FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE IN THE STATE 
COURTS 166 (1995), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/publications/Res_CtInte_ 
ModeIGuideChapter7Pub.pdf. The author's anecdotal experience, corroborated by ex­
tensive conversations over many years with legal interpreter colleagues, as well as gen­
eral media portrayal of Deaf people, also supports this statement. 
71. McAlister, supra note 13, at 173. 
72. Id. at 172. 
73. Id. 
74. BERYL LIEFF BENDERLY, DANCING WITHOUT MUSIC: DEAFNESS IN 
AMERICA 25 (Gallaudet University Press 2002) (1980). 
75. Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, Inc., http://www.rid.org (last visited May 
9,2007). 
76. Id. 
77. Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, About NTS (National Testing System), 
http://www.rid.org/education/testing/index.cfmlAID/82 (last visited May 9, 2007); Regis­
try of Interpreters for the Deaf, About RID, http://www.rid.org.aboutRID/overview/ 
index.cfm (last visited May 9, 2007). 
78. SPECIALIST CERTIFICATE: LEGAL (SC:L) EXAMINATION INFORMATION BUL­
LETIN 3 (2006), available at http://www.rid.org/UserFileslFile/pdfs/Certification_ 
Documen ts/SCL_ Candida te_Bulletin. pdf. 
2007] DEAF DEFENDANTS AND THE MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIARY 929 
ensure that only the most skilled and highly trained interpreters are 
working in the courtS.79 
In Massachusetts, MCDHH is the agency responsible for en­
suring the qualifications of such interpreters.8o MCDHH recog­
nizes the RID SC:L, but it also has its own stringent qualifying 
system for those interpreters who want to work in the courtS.81 This 
has been true since the legislature originally charged the MOD­
before it became MCDHH-with developing criteria for qualifying 
legal interpreters to comply with the 1971 Interpreter Law.82 When 
the Interpreter Law was amended to include all court proceedings, 
not just those happening in superior court, the legislature added the 
requirement that MCDHH must develop its policies for qualifying 
legal interpreters in conjunction with the Massachusetts Registry of 
Interpreters for the Deaf, the local chapter of RID, Inc., and the 
Massachusetts State Association of the Deaf, the local chapter of 
the national political and social justice action group of the Deaf 
community-the National Association of the Deaf.83 
So, even before RID, Inc. established its national testing sys­
tem in 1972 to ensure that interpreters had minimum qualifications, 
the Massachusetts legislature already understood that Deaf defend­
ants and parties needed to be able to have court proceedings 
presented to them in ASL, as evidenced by the passage of the 1971 
Interpreter Law. The qualifying system MCDHH developed in re­
sponse to this legislative mandate is still used today by the agency, 
side by side with, or sometimes instead of, the RID SC:L to assure 
that qualified interpreters are working in Massachusetts courtS.84 
79. /d. 
80. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004) ("[MCDHH] shall coordinate all re­
quests for qualified interpreters and shall maintain a list of all such interpreters from 
which it shall fill requests. "). 
81. /d. MCDHH deems interpreters qualified "based upon the recommendations 
of the Massachusetts Registry of the Deaf, the Massachusetts State Association of the 
Deaf and other appropriate agencies." Id. 
82. An Act Providing for the Appointment of Interpreters for The Deaf in Supe­
rior Court Proceedings, ch. 459, 1971 Mass. Acts 306 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
221, § 92A (1971». 
83. An Act Establishing a Commission for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, ch. 
716,1985 Mass. Acts 1106 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004». 
84. Based on the author's personal knowledge. There is no written policy on this 
from MCDHH. The author was "MCDHH approved" to work as an interpreter in the 
courts prior to receiving her SC:L, having completed a rigorous training program and 
over one hundred hours of extern ship under a seasoned legal interpreter. Of the thir­
teen interpreters qualified to work in the Massachusetts courts, only three hold the 
SC:L. Telephone interview with Kellie Hickey, supra note 20. The other ten are "ap­
proved" by MCDHH to work in courts and other legal settings. Id. 
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2. The Need for Qualified Interpreters in Court 
Having qualified and highly skilled interpreters working in the 
courts and other legal settings is critical to Deaf parties' under­
standing of the proceedings, especially for Deaf criminal defend­
ants.85 Without the aid of an interpreter, a Deaf defendant is 
effectively denied access to those proceedings, although such access 
is guaranteed by the Massachusetts Constitution.86 Massachusetts 
law states that "[a] person accused of crime shall at his trial be al­
lowed to be heard by counsel, to defend himself, to produce wit­
nesses and proofs in his favor and to meet the witnesses produced 
against him face to face. "87 The legislature strove to ensure that 
Deaf people would be able to communicate with counsel, aid in 
their own defense, and in all ways participate meaningfully in any 
proceedings in which they were involved.88 It made sense that the 
agency to oversee and ensure the highest standards for interpreters 
would be MCDHH, with its Deaf commissioner, its commitment to 
hiring Deaf staff, and its knowledge of Deaf people's language and 
culture.89 Standards such as the RID SC:L and the Massachusetts 
approval process for qualified interpreters desiring to work in the 
courts and legal settings are critical. Unless such standards are 
maintained by people who understand ASL and the interpreting 
process, any person who looked to court personnel like they could 
sign would end up working in the courtS.90 
85. REPORT ON INTERPRETER SERVICES IN THE VERMONT COURTS, supra note 
59, at 6. 
86. The Massachusetts Constitution states, in pertinent part, "No subject shall be 
held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and plainly, substan­
tially and formally, described to him." MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12. It goes on to track 
the due process, jury of one's peers, right to face witnesses, and right to remain silent 
language of the U.S. Constitution. [d. For a comprehensive examination of the case 
law that supports this proposition, see Berko, supra note 13; Sarno, supra note 13. 
87. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 263, § 5 (2004). 
88. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004). 
89. For a complete understanding of the mandates of MCDHH, which include 
hiring competent Deaf staff whenever possible, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 191-199 
(2004). 
90. Based on the author's anecdotal experience, having worked as an interpreter 
throughout the United States; informal discussion with legal interpreters at the Iron 
Sharpens Iron Conference for Legal Interpreters in Atlanta, GA, May 2004; informal 
discussion with legal interpreter colleagues in New York, California, Tennessee, Ken­
tucky, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Maine. Without stringent standards as to 
who can and cannot work in court, courts tend to do what is convenient and low in cost, 
regardless of the effectiveness of the communication with Deaf parties. [d.; see also 
supra text accompanying note 59. 
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Without clear, accurate interpretation by an interpreter who is 
fluent in ASL, the Deaf defendant has little chance of understand­
ing the message, which means little chance of understanding his 
rights, his attorney, and the proceedings in general.91 In United 
States ex reI. Negron v. New York, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit observed, "[T]he government does not dispute the 
nearly self-evident proposition that an indigent defendant who 
could speak and understand no English would have a right to have 
his trial proceedings translated so as to permit him to participate 
effectively in his own defense."92 Indeed, a lack of appropriate 
grammatical and "syntactic information can be catastrophic to the 
Deaf individual[] . . . [it would be] somewhat akin to a hearing 
person trying to make sense of the indecipherable word salads of 
schizophrenics."93 In sum, by passing the 1971 Interpreter Law and 
its 1985 amendment, and by establishing MCDHH and charging it 
with qualifying interpreters for court and legal settings, the legisla­
ture recognized the critical need for highly skilled ASLIEnglish in­
terpreters in the courts in order to allow Deaf defendants to fully 
participate in the proceedings against them. 
E. The Case Law 
1. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court 94 
The situation faced by John Sandoval in the hypothetical above 
is similar to that faced by Nathaniel Lavallee in Lavallee v. Justices 
in the Hampden Superior Court95 in that neither had access to an 
attorney, albeit for different reasons. On May 3, 2004, Mr. Lavallee 
was arraigned without the benefit of counsel in the Springfield Dis­
trict Court in Springfield, Massachusetts.96 Thereafter, he and eigh­
teen other indigent defendants, also arraigned without counsel 
being present, were held in lieu of bailor under preventive deten­
tion pending assignment of counsel and the start of their proceed­
ings.97 Mr. Lavallee and the other indigent defendants faced this 
predicament because of a crisis level shortage of counsel for indi­
91. Hoopes, supra note 40, at 33-34. 
92. United States ex reI. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970). 
93. Hoopes, supra note 40, at 34. 
94. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 
2004). 
95. Id. at 901. 
96. Id. 
97. [d. at 901-02. 
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gent defendants available to the courtS.98 The shortage reached a 
crisis level as a result of "the low rate of ... compensation [for 
defense attorneys for the indigent] authorized by the annual budget 
appropriation."99 The Supreme Judicial Court found that the rates 
of pay for counsel that could be assigned to indigent defendants in 
Massachusetts were "among the lowest in the nation."IOO As a re­
sult, private attorneys stopped accepting defense bar appointments 
from the courts and, on the dates at issue, there had been no de­
fense counsel present in the Springfield District Court for two con­
secutive days.1OI 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the Attorney General's 
suggestion that one solution to this shortage could be that the dis­
trict attorney would charge more crimes as civil rather than criminal 
infractions, thereby removing the need for appointed counse1.102 
The court, in describing why this was not an appropriate remedy, 
stated, "The discretion of the district attorney to charge certain of­
fenses as civil infractions is an exclusively executive prerogative, 
and a judge'S discretion with respect to sentencing should be based 
on the customary factors governing disposition, not on the difficul­
ties of securing counsel for the defendant."103 The court was em­
phasizing that not only was the legislature encroaching on the 
court's boundaries, but also that the court would not, as a remedy, 
encroach upon the executive.I04 Further, the court seemed to be 
saying that it had a right to function as it always had without chang­
ing or bending the rules because of the legislature's failure to raise 
the pay of defense attorneys appointed to represent indigent 
clients. lOS 
In the end, the court found that indigent defendants were re­
ceiving disparate treatment in the courts based on their economic 
status, in violation of the Massachusetts Constitution.106 It held 
that incarcerating indigent defendants without providing access to 
counsel violated those defendants' article 12 right to counsel, which 
mirrors the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under the U.S. Con­
98. See id. at 899. 
99. [d. at 900. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 901. 
102. Id. at 906-07. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 906. 
106. Id. 
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stitution.107 The court found that the lack of defense counsel for 
indigent defendants was a chronic problem; it led to the infringe­
ment of their constitutional rights.108 The court further found that 
the cause of the shortage of private counsel for indigent defendants 
was the low rate of pay authorized by the state legislature, com­
bined with its chronic under-funding of the Committee for Public 
Counsel Services (CPCS), the Commonwealth's publicly funded de­
fense bar.109 Without adequate funding, CPCS could not hire 
enough staff attorneys to represent all of the indigent defendants 
who needed their services; nor, regardless of funding, could CPCS 
attorneys represent defendants where there were conflicts of inter­
est.l1o Private defense attorneys who could be assigned to indigent 
defendants were needed to supplement the services provided by 
CPCS.111 But the legislature had not increased the appropriation to 
CPCS for private attorneys so it could pay a higher hourly rate, and 
so over time, private attorneys took fewer and fewer cases until the 
crisis-level shortage the Lavallee defendants faced had 
developed.112 
The court concluded that "[t]he continuation of what is now an 
unconstitutional state of affairs cannot be tolerated."113 In explain­
ing its holding the court stated "Proceedings in which a defendant 
cannot participate meaningfully may not be allowed to proceed."114 
The court then held that indigent defendants who did not have 
counsel appointed must be released after seven days, regardless of 
the charges against them, and that all charges must be dismissed 
without prejudice after forty-five days if counsel still had not been 
appointed.l1s In addressing the Attorney General's concerns about 
the public's safety upon the release of potentially dangerous 
criminals, the court stated that while it shared his concerns, the re­
sponsibility for providing counsel to indigent defendants was 
squarely on the State.116 Although the court was "confident that all 
branches [of state government WOUld] work diligently" to address 
107. Id. at 903; see U.S. CONST. amend VI; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12. 
108. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 903. 
109. Id. at 900. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 909. 
112. See id. at 900-01. 
113. Id. at 910. 
114. Id. at 911. 
115. Id. at 912. 
116. Id. at 907, 910. 
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the problem,117 it also intimated that by virtue of its disposition of 
this case, it had the ability to put pressure on the legislature in par­
ticular to find a monetary solution.118 Within a month, the Massa­
chusetts legislature raised the hourly pay rates for court-appointed 
defense counsel.119 
2. 	 Injunctive Relief under Judge Rotenberg Educational 
Center and Sheriff of Suffolk County 
Where injunctive relief to aggrieved parties could affect a pub­
lic agency's ability to carry out its discretionary functions, the courts 
give deference to the agency's interpretation or implementation of 
its own regulations.12o But when an agency's implementation of its 
regulations violates the law, it is appropriate for courts to inter­
vene.121 Further, when an agency's policies encroach on the func­
tions of the judiciary, the court can order a writ of mandamus 
requiring the agency to take affirmative steps to eliminate such 
encroachment.122 
The cases that govern here are Judge Rotenberg Educational 
Center v. Commissioner of the Department of Mental Retardation 
and Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County.123 In each of 
these cases, the Supreme Judicial Court took the extraordinary step 
of issuing a writ of mandamus ordering an executive body to take a 
specific action.124 These cases stand for the proposition that man­
damus can issue when (a) the legislature is not adequately funding a 
program mandated to protect the constitutional rights of individuals 
and the court deems it appropriate to put pressure on the legisla­
ture to fully fund the program at issue; (b) an executive agency or 
117. Id. at 910. 
118. Id. at 908 (explaining what other state courts have done to put pressure on 
their legislatures to raise the rates of pay for attorneys representing indigent clients). 
119. SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A CASE 
HISTORY OF REFORM 4 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/ 
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefenseIMAindigdefreform2005.pdf. 
120. Correia v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 605 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Mass. 1993). 
121. Id. ("When an agency's implementation of its regulations violates the law ... 
it is entirely appropriate for a court to order relief. "). 
122. See Att'y Gen. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d 361 (Mass. 1985). 
123. Id.; Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr. v. Comm'r of Dep't of Mental Retardation, 
677 N.E.2d 127 (Mass. 1997). 
124. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d at 361 (affirming the trial judge's or­
ders to the sheriff of Suffolk County); Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., 677 N.E.2d at 152 
(affirming the lower court's writ: "These considerations [that the trial court judge's or­
der swept too broadly], however, do not affect our conclusion that the judge did not 
otherwise exceed her authority"). 
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government body is obstructing the court from its timely and effi­
cient administration of justice; or ( c) an agency takes action, or 
takes no action, in violation of an individual's constitutional rights. 
In Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, the families of several 
children with autism and mental retardation sued the Department 
of Mental Retardation (DMR) for failing to continue providing cer­
tain aversive therapies that they felt would prolong the lives of their 
children.125 A substituted judgment order was entered by the pro­
bate court in accordance with DMR's regulations, and the parties 
entered into a settlement agreement.126 However, the director of 
the Office for Children, a designee of DMR, refused in bad faith to 
follow the order which required certifying the Judge Rotenberg Ed­
ucational Center to provide the aversive therapy treatment.127 The 
Supreme Judicial Court, on appeal, acknowledged that it could not 
replace DMR's judgment with its own regarding certification and 
the applicable regulations, because that would be carrying out an 
executive function.128 However, the court held that it could require 
that DMR (and thereby the Office for Children) follow the probate 
court's order requiring certification where an agency meets DMR's 
requirements for certification.129 In other words, an agency must 
follow its own regulations which adhere to its legislative mandate, 
and a court can compel the agency to do so. The court stressed that 
allowing the department to ignore a judge's order would intrude 
on the function of the courts, for there is no doubt that the ability 
to enter orders is necessary to the' very existence of the court and 
essential to the maintenance of the court's authority ... , It is just 
this sort of intrusion that art. 30 prohibits.13o 
In Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, the Supreme 
Judicial Court issued a mandamus ordering the Boston City Council 
to build a seventeen-story jail facility.!31 There was overcrowding 
at the original jail facility that made it impossible for all of the pris­
oners to be housed there.132 This meant that many prisoners had to 
125. Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., 677 N.E.2d at 132-33. 
126. Id. at 131-32. 
127. Id. at 132. 
128. Id. at 139. 
129. Id. at 139-40. 
130. Id. (citing Att'y Gen. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d 361 (Mass. 
1985); Chief Admin. Justice of the Trial Court v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 533 N.E.2d 
1313 (Mass. 1989)). 
131. Att'y Gen. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d 361, 364 (Mass. 1985). 
132. Id. at 362. 
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be housed in, and transported to and from, other jails and prisons, 
sometimes hours away.133 This made speedy administration of jus­
tice for those prisoners problematic.134 The court found that the 
City Council was encroaching upon the judiciary through its non­
feasance in refusing to build the jail.135 The court issued a manda­
mus to force the City Council to build a particular jail that would 
allow for the more efficient operation of the courts.136 In so doing, 
the court stated "the City Council's failure to construct a suitable 
jail ... may interfere with the functioning of the judicial branch," 
and that such interference was imperrnissible.137 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. 	 The Court Should Give Deaf Defendants Interpreters or 
Let Them Go 
The Supreme Judicial Court has clear precedent for releasing 
Deaf defendants who have not received interpreter services in a 
timely fashion. 138 The similarities between Lavallee and the hypo­
thetical subject of this Note cannot be ignored. Without access to a 
defense attorney through a legally qualified ASLlEnglish inter­
preter, a Deaf defendant cannot meaningfully participate in the 
proceedings, nor can he access counselor participate in his own 
defense. Just as CPCS, with its inadequate state funding, was una­
ble to procure enough attorneys from its staff to cover all of the 
indigent defense needs for the state,139 so MCDHH, with its inade­
quate state funding, is unable to procure enough interpreters to 
cover all of the needs of Deaf defendants for the state.140 Were the 
court faced with an actual case like the hypothetical John Sando­
val's, it should apply its reasoning used in Lavallee and hold that 
Deaf defendants who are being held in jail and who do not receive 
interpreter services in a timely manner should be released. 
Regarding indigent defendants not having access to defense at­
torneys, the Lavallee Court concluded that "the continuation of 
133. 	 Id. 
134. 	 See id. 
135. 	 Id. at 365. 
136. 	 Id. at 366. 
137. 	 Id. at 365. 
138. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 901 
(Mass. 2004). 
139. 	 Id. 
140. Id.; PEOPLE FIRST, supra note 8, at 37-38 (identifying the severe shortage of 
ASUEnglish interpreters). 
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what is now an unconstitutional state of affairs cannot be toler­
ated,"141 and "[p]roceedings in which a defendant cannot partici­
pate meaningfully may not be allowed to proceed."142 Likewise, 
when a Deaf defendant like John Sandoval cannot communicate 
with his attorney because no qualified ASLIEnglish interpreter is 
available, he is unable to "participate meaningfully" in his own de­
fense or in any proceedings against him. The Interpreter Law re­
quires that courts appoint MCDHH-qualified interpreters for Deaf 
defendants.143 Without a qualified court interpreter, a Deaf defen­
dant in practical effect does not have access to counsel and as such 
should be released under the same terms as those set out in 
Lavallee.144 
Further, as in Lavallee, Deaf defendants are routinely "held ... 
without the assistance of counsel"145 for several days and some­
times weeks, because no interpreters are available.146 Holding 
Deaf defendants without explanation while they wait for interpret­
ers to become available deprives them of their liberty, which impli­
cates "the principles of procedural due process in Article 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights."147 One of the rights impli­
cated is "the right to be heard, which necessarily includes the right 
to be heard by counsel."148 Without the assistance of an inter­
preter, Deaf defendants cannot be heard by the courts or by coun­
sel, and therefore, their article 12 due process rights are being 
violated. 
The Lavallee court held that such violations are impermissible 
for indigent defendants;149 likewise, they should not stand where 
Deaf defendants are concerned. The court stated that it could not 
"countenance allowing a criminal prosecution to proceed against a 
defendant who does not have the benefit of counsel up to and in­
cluding a trial on criminal charges for which he could face incarcer­
ation."15o Without interpreters, Deaf defendants do not "have the 
benefit of counsel" either. Thus, just as the indigent defendants 
141. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 910. 
142. [d. at 911. 
143. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004). 
144. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 912. 
145. Id. at 902. 
146. Telephone Interview with Kellie Hickey, supra note 20. 
147. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 902; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 12. 
148. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 902. 
149. /d. at 903. 
150. Id. at 907. 
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were released where no counsel could be appointed, so should Deaf 
defendants be released where no interpreters can be obtained.l5l 
In fashioning this remedy, the court's clear intention was to 
pressure the legislature to immediately increase the pay of attor­
neys appointed to represent indigent defendants. I52 This intent was 
evidenced by the court's reference to several other states' supreme 
court cases on this same issue, where those courts did use their in­
herent power to temporarily raise the pay of defense attorneys for 
indigent defendants pending action from their respective legisla­
tures. I53 The court was clearly telling the legislature and the execu­
tive (the Attorney General) to take whatever steps were necessary 
to ensure the efficient administration of justice by the courts. 
The court should make a similar order here: where a case must 
be continued more than once due to lack of interpreter availability, 
the Deaf defendant should either be released or have his pending 
case dismissed. Such an order would put the same kind of pressure 
on the legislature to adequately fund MCDHH to enable it to re­
cruit, train, and maintain qualified interpreters for court and legal 
settings. 
B. 	 Alternatively, the Court Should Order MCDHH to Recruit, 
Train, and Retain Interpreters 




The Supreme Judicial Court can and should issue a writ of 
mandamus ordering MCDHH to recruit, train, and retain an ade­
151. 	 See id. 
152. Id. at 907-08; Spangenberg Group, Major Reform Legislation Passed in Mas­
sachusetts, http://www.spangenberggroup.comlnewslMassReformLegislation.html (last 
visited May 9, 2007) (citing Lavallee as a catalyst for the legislature's appropriation of 
funds to increase the pay of counsel appointed to indigent defendants); Issue 
Source.org, Issue: Public Defender Pay, http://www.issuesource.org/issue.cfm?ID=134 
(last visited May 9, 2007) (describing Lavallee as the point at which "[t]he uproar 
reached a crescendo," which then led to the increase in pay for counsel appointed to 
indigent defendants). 
153. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 907-08 (citing State ex rei. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 
S.W.2d 64, 67-68 (Mo. 1981); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1164 (Okla. 1990); N.Y. 
County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003)) ("In other 
circumstances State courts of last resort have granted preliminary relief in the form of 
increased compensation rates, but have simultaneously directed their Legislatures to 
amend permanently the compensation rates for indigent representation. A New York 
trial court recently issued a permanent injunction directing that counsel be paid ninety 
dollars per hour, and removed the statutory fee cap until the Legislature changed the 
rates and increased its appropriation for compensation for indigent representation."). 
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quate pool of legally qualified interpreters to work in the courts. 
Because the Massachusetts legislature has recognized the need for 
Deaf defendants to have interpreters in court and legal settings, and 
because the fill rate is still so low, there is a conflict. Not only are 
Deaf people being denied access to their proceedings, but also, the 
courts are unable to adjudicate their criminal cases in a timely 
fashion. 
Whether the court can intervene to order MCDHH to fulfill its 
legislatively mandated duties is governed by the Massachusetts 
Constitution's Separation of Powers provision,ls4 which provides: 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative de­
partment shall never exe.cise the executive and judicial powers, 
or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legisla­
tive and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never 
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: 
to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men. ISS 
Issuing a writ of mandamus against MCDHH does not violate the 
Separation of Powers Clause. First, when an agency violates the 
constitutional or statutory rights of an individual, the court may in­
tervene and order the agency to fulfill its legislative mandate. Sec­
ond, under extraordinary circumstances, and when there is no other 
legal remedy, the court can order structural injunctive relief via a 
writ of mandamus. The writ of mandamus exists to compel per­
formance of a clear, non-discretionary duty.1s6 
When the legislature issues a mandate to an agency, the court 
must give deference to that agency's policies in carrying out the 
mandate.1s7 On the rare occasion that an agency does not fulfill its 
mandate sufficiently, the court must tread lightly and will assume 
the agency is fulfilling its mandate without intervention or supervi­
sion.ISS However, "[w]hen an agency's implementation of its regu­
154. MCDHH does not, in general, provide direct services like other agencies, 
and so it does not have a consumer grievance policy which would include an administra­
tive hearing. Telephone conversation with Patricia Ford, Deputy Commissioner of Poli­
cies, MCDHH, in Dorchester, Mass. (Jan. 13, 2006). Because of this, it does not fall 
within the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA). Therefore no analy­
sis under MAPA will be undertaken in this Note. 
155. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30 (a court can only order an executive body to do 
something if it does not violate the separation of powers-"the judicial shall never exer­
cise the legislative and executive powers or either of them"). 
156. See generally id.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (Z004). 
157. Correia v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 605 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Mass. 1993). 
158. Id. (citing In re McKnight, 550 N.E.Zd 856, 859 (1990» ("Where, as here, an 
injunction arguably affects a public agency's exercise of its discretionary functions, 
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lations violates the law, it is entirely appropriate for a court to order 
relief."159 Also, "[a]n agency regulation that is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute and its underlying purpose may be rejected 
by the courtS."160 In other words, if an agency's policies overreach 
the statute governing it, the court can step in only to ensure the 
agency adheres to the letter and spirit of the law.161 The court "in­
terferes" only to redress the harm the agency causes by overreach­
ing its mandate.162 Thus the court serves a vital role in preserving 
the separate functions of each branch of government so that each 
may operate smoothly and efficiently. 
Here, MCDHH's policies have been, and continue to be, in 
contravention of its legislative mandate to provide or ensure the 
provision of interpreter services.163 As such, the court can step 
in.164 MCDHH overreached its mandate when it created a policy 
requiring nationally certified legal interpreters from neighboring 
states to submit both their certification and further documentation 
of their training and work experience to prove that they were quali­
fied.165 This is a needlessly redundant requirement166 since national 
certification for legal settings exceeds the requirements of the 
courts must tread lightly in ordering action contrary to the agency's interpretation of its 
own regulations."). 
159. Id. (citation omitted). 
160. Smith v. Comm'r of Transitional Assistance, 729 N.E.2d 627, 633 (Mass. 
2000). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 637. "Although injunctive as well as declaratory relief may sometimes 
be necessary to ensure that an agency will fulfil its statutory mandate, 'it has been our 
practice to assume that public officials will comply with the law declared by a court and 
that consequently injunctive orders are generally unnecessary.'" Id. (quoting Mass. 
Coal. for the Homeless v. Sec'y of Human Servs., 511 N.E.2d 603, 614 (Mass. 1987». 
163. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 191-199 (2004). 
164. See Smith, 729 N.E.2d at 633. 
165. Conversation with Karen Higgins, former Director of CART & Interpreter 
Servs., Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing (Jan. 24, 2003). In order to sit 
for the SC:L or to be MCDHH-approved, an interpreter must submit proof of hours 
mentored by an experienced legal interpreter holding her SC:L, as well as hours worked 
in each specific court or legal setting. Once an interpreter passes the SC:L, there is no 
need to keep this documentation. See SPECIALIST CERTIFICATE: LEGAL (SC:L) EXAMI­
NATION INFORMATION BULLETIN, supra note 78, at 4-5. 
166. MCDHH has not officially repealed the old policy since Karen Higgins left 
her position as Director of CART and Interpreter Services. However, Amy William­
son-Loga told the author that she was offered court and legal work by MCDHH after 
Ms. Higgins departure, without requiring any documentation beyond a copy of her 
SC:L and the author's recommendation. Conversation with Amy Williamson-Loga, CI 
& CT, SC:L (2005). 
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MCDHH approval process.167 MCDHH's policy effectively pre­
vented those interpreters from working in Massachusetts, since 
once an interpreter is nationally certified for legal assignments, 
there is no need to retain documentation of one's mentorship 
hours, specific court assignments or training.168 MCDHH's policies 
have made it difficult, if not impossible, for qualified, out-of-state 
interpreters to work in Massachusetts. 
A parallel can be drawn to the holding in Judge Rotenberg Ed­
ucational Center.169 Although Judge Rotenberg Educational Center 
addressed malfeasance, by analogy, the same kind of judicial inter­
vention is appropriate in the case of an agency's nonfeasance. 
Here, by not recruiting, training, and increasing the pool of quali­
fied legal interpreterspO MCDHH is encroaching on the courts' 
abilities to administer justice, as proceedings involving Deaf de­
fendants cannot go forward without qualified interpreters 
present.171 
MCDHH has been aware of the severe shortage of legally 
qualified interpreters for many years and has done little to remedy 
the situation.l72 In 2000, MCDHH co-sponsored, in conjunction 
with the Administrative Office of the Trial Court, a single intensive 
training for working interpreters who wanted to pursue work in the 
courts and legal settings.173 This has been the only in-court legal 
training MCDHH has sponsored since its inception in 1985. 
167. See SPECIALIST CERTIFICATE: LEGAL (SC:L) EXAMINATION INFORMATION 
BULLETIN, supra note 78, at 11. RID, Inc. requires a performance exam that is evalu­
ated by qualified raters from all over the United States. MCDHH only requires train­
ing and mentorship, but no performance exam. 
168. See supra note 165. 
169. Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr. v. Comm'r of Dep't of Mental Retardation, 677 
N.E.2d 127 (Mass. 1997). 
170. Some interpreters have actually been prevented from working within the 
state. MCDHH had a policy for several years requiring the same extensive documenta­
tion of qualifications for interpreters with their SC:L as those seeking to become 
MCDHH approved to work in the courts. This policy was cumbersome and duplicative, 
since in order to sit for the SC:L an interpreter must also submit the same documenta­
tion to RID, Inc. For those who took their SC:L exams years ago, retrieving that docu­
mentation can be problematic and as a result, several interpreters over the years have 
declined to "jump through the hoops." Since the RID SC:L exceeds the MCDHH ap­
proval system in terms of quality assurance, the policy serves no discernable purpose. 
171. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004). 
172. See PEOPLE FIRST, supra note 8 (identifying the severe shortage of ASU 
English interpreters, and yet only asking for a funding increase for CART reporters). 
173. AOTC & MCDHH: THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM WITH EMPHASIS ON 
THE MASSACHUSETTS COURT SYSTEM FOR INTERPRETERS SERVING DEAF & HARD OF 
HEARING INDIVIDUALS (Lewana Clark ed., 2000) (training manual on file with the 
author). 
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The law establishing MCDHH clearly states that MCDHH 
"shall serve as the principal agency of the commonwealth, on behalf 
of deaf ... persons."174 It further states that MCDHH "shall pro­
mote development of new services when necessary, ... provide ... 
interpreting services," and "determine the need for further services, 
mak[ing] recommendations to the governor" as necessaryY5 The 
law also states that MCDHH may apply for both federal and local 
grants, and it may also apply for private grants and bequests to "aid 
in the financing of programs or policies of the commission."176 Al­
though MCDHH has often engaged in partnerships with other state 
agencies, there is no evidence this author has been able to obtain 
that it sought or received private funding to start or maintain vital 
projects prior to 2006.177 The legislature made MCDHH responsi­
ble for adequate provision of interpreting services for the courts 
and the commission has not fulfilled its duty. Thus, the court can 
and should issue a writ of mandamus, ordering MCDHH to fulfill 
its legislatively mandated duty. 
Similarly, in Sheriff ofSuffolk County, the City Council of Bos­
ton challenged the propriety of the court's issuance of a mandamus 
to compel the City Council to appropriate funds to build a city 
jail.t78 The court stated that the challenge was without merit be­
cause "[t]he obligation of the City Council to provide a suitable jail 
is not discretionary."179 As noted earlier, the law of mandamus ex­
ists to compel performance of a clear, non-discretionary duty on the 
part of any agency, court, or governmental entity.18o The court thus 
has the right, in extraordinary circumstances, to use a mandamus to 
compel an arm of the executive to carry out its non-discretionary 
duty, especially when, by failing in such a duty, the executive is en­
croaching on another branch of government. 
MCDHH has a non-discretionary duty to provide and ensure 
the provision of interpreter services,181 a duty it has failed to fulfill. 
174. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 194 (2004). 
175. Id. 
176. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 192 (2004). 
177. In June 2006, MCDHH hired a Projects Coordinator-a person responsible 
for seeking out additional sources of funding. Telephone conversation with Mary Kate 
Laughran, Human Res. Liaison, Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing in 
Dorchester, Mass. (Feb. 27,2006). 
178. Att'y Gen. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d 361, 363-34 (Mass. 1985). 
179. Id. 
180. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (2004) ("[Courts] may issue such writs ... as 
may be necessary or desirable for the furtherance of justice, the regular execution of the 
laws ... and the securing of [the courts'] proper and efficient administration ...."). 
181. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 191-199 (2004). 
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Aside from partnering with the Administrative Office of the Trial 
Court one time in 2000, MCDHH has done little to increase the 
pool of interpreters qualified to work in court and legal settings. 
MCDHH has not secured permanent funding for training to rem­
edy the severe shortage of interpreters for the courts; instead it 
funds only sporadic trainings.182 Such one-time trainings do not 
work to increase the pool of legally qualified interpreters, as evi­
denced by the static number of interpreters for the courts over the 
last thirty years.183 Thus, under the standards set in Sheriff of Suf­
folk County and Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, the court can 
and should order MCDHH to abide by its non-discretionary man­
dates and do whatever it must to increase the pool of interpreters 
for the courts. 
2. 	 The Court Should Issue Mandamus in Response to 
Legislative and Executive Encroachment on the 
Judiciary 
In Lavallee, the court ordered injunctive relief enjoining the 
courts, the Attorney General, and the District Attorney from hold­
ing indigent defendants in jail for more than seven days without an 
attorney appointed or continuing cases against indigent defendants 
not held in jail for more than forty-five days without an attorney 
appointed.184 The court was aware that the people of the Common­
wealth and legislators would not want dangerous criminals summa­
rily released without process or safeguards.18s The clear purpose of 
this injunctive relief was to put direct pressure on the legislature to 
act to raise the pay for attorneys appointed to represent indigent 
defendants.186 The court should put similar pressure on MCDHH. 
Because the legislature has not adequately funded MCDHH to 
recruit, train, and maintain a sufficient number of qualified inter­
preters to work in the courts, and MCDHH has not taken adequate . 
steps to increase the pool of such qualified interpreters, a writ of 
mandamus would be warranted. Massachusetts General Laws 
chapter 211, section 3 states in pertinent part that "[courts] may 
182. For example, as of the writing of this Note, MCDHH is currently offering a 
multi-part out-of-court training for interpreters who want to work in non-court legal 
settings. Flyer from the Mass. Comm'n for the Deaf & Hard of Hearing, Training for 
Out-of-Court Legal Assignments (Sept. 2006) (on file with author). 
183. Interview with Joan Wattman, supra note 28. 
184. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 912 
(Mass. 2004). 
185. Id. at 910. 
186. See id. at 899-902. 
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issue such writs ... as may be necessary or desirable for the further­
ance of justice, the regular execution of the laws ... and the secur­
ing of [the courts'] proper and efficient administration."187 Without 
enough interpreters to serve all Deaf parties in the Commonwealth, 
the judiciary cannot mete out justice in a timely or efficient manner. 
Justice cannot be administered without the ability of the court to 
secure a defendant's presence at trial,188 "The ability to secure a 
defendant's presence at trial is of fundamental importance to the 
basic functioning of the judiciary, without which justice cannot be 
administered."189 According to Massachusetts law, without an in­
terpreter a Deaf defendant is effectively not present and the pro­
ceedings cannot go forward. 190 
By enacting laws making MCDHH the only agency that can 
both qualify and refer interpreters for the courts, and then failing to 
adequately fund such a mandate, the legislature has contributed to 
the shortage of interpreters that now encroaches upon the judici­
ary's ability to administer justice.191 As such, the court can order 
MCDHH to secure adequate permanent funding for annual inter­
preter training. In the alternative, the court can order the Com­
monwealth to release all Deaf defendants whose cases have been 
continued more than once due to lack of interpreter services, with 
the intention of pressuring the legislature to appropriate funds to 
MCDHH for recruitment, training, and retention of interpreters 
qualified to work in the courts and other legal settings. 
C. Injunctive Relief Would Not Violate the Separation of Powers 
The circumstances under which injunctive relief can be granted 
are limited by the Separation of Powers Clause of the Massachu­
setts Constitution;192 and as the law of mandamus states unequivo­
187. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (2004). 
188. Querubin v. Commonwealth, 795 N.E.2d 534, 540 (Mass. 2003). 
189. Id. 
190. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (2004). 
191. There is no doubt that the letter and spirit of the Interpreter Law are cor­
rect-we have already seen that requiring interpreters for court proceedings is the only 
way Deaf defendants can meaningfully participate. Further, it is also correct that 
MCDHH-in conjunction with Massachusetts Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf and 
the Massachusetts State Association of the Deaf-should be the qualifying and refer­
ring body. High standards for interpreters working in the courts are critical to ensuring 
that Deaf defendants actually have access to the proceedings. See generally REpORT ON 
INTERPRETER SERVICES IN THE VERMONT COURTS, supra note 59; LaVigne & Vernon, 
supra note 13; Berko, supra note 13. 
192. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30. 
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cally, those circumstances must be extraordinary.193 In contrast to 
Lavallee and Sheriff of Suffolk County, the Supreme Judicial Court 
in Commonwealth v. Leno held that it was not appropriate to issue 
injunctive relief.194 But in that case, the facts did not warrant it as 
they do here. The court stated that the separation of powers as 
articulated in article 30 prevents the '''judiciary [from] substituting 
its notions of correct policy for that of a popularly elected Legisla­
ture.' "195 In explaining the crucial importance of the separation of 
powers, the court stated that "[w]hether a statute is wise or effec­
tive is not within the province of courts," and that the court's only 
role is to determine whether the statute is constitutional, giving 
great deference to the presumption that it is.l96 
In Leno, the defendants, who were trying to prevent the spread 
of HIV/AIDS among intravenous drug users, were convicted of 
needle distribution in violation of a Massachusetts statute prohibit­
ing the sale or distribution of any drug paraphernalia without a pre­
scription.l97 The basis for their appeal was the trial court's denial of 
the defendants' requested jury instruction of necessity-that they 
had no other legal way of preventing the spread of AIDS because 
of the statute preventing needle distribution.198 In affirming the 
trial court's verdict, the court made clear that the defendants had 
alternative legal recourse through the legislative process; that they 
could petition their legislators to change the statute prohibiting 
needle distribution.199 The court's point was that if the non-elected 
judiciary stepped in and in effect assumed a legislative function, the 
right of the people to create constitutional laws would be emascu­
lated, and as such the court's action would be a violation of the 
constitution.20o 
In contrast, by enacting laws regarding Deaf people and inter­
preters in the courts without granting adequate funding to 
MCDHH, the legislature has impermissibly encroached on the judi­
ciary's ability to function smoothly, efficiently, and without oppres­
sion of the parties to its proceedings. In fact, Deaf defendants, like 
the hypothetical John Sandoval, suffer egregious oppression each 
193. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (2004). 
194. Commonwealth v. Leno, 616 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1993). 
195. Id. at 457 (quoting Zayre Corp. v. Att'y Gen., 362 N.E.2d 878 (Mass. 1977)). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 454. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 457. 
200. Id. 
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time their cases are continued and they have to stay in jail longer 
than their hearing counterparts would have. Unlike in Leno, there 
is nothing for the legislature to act on here. The legislature has 
already passed the Interpreter Law, which expressly protects Deaf 
defendants' constitutional rights.201 
The problem, as in Lavallee, is that the legislature has not com­
mitted nearly enough funds to MCDHH to allow it to carry out its 
legislative mandate to ensure the provision of interpreters for the 
courtS.202 In Lavallee, the legislature's inadequate appropriation of 
funds to CPCS led to the underpayment of defense attorneys ap­
pointed to represent indigent defendants, which ultimately led to 
the crisis-level shortage of such attorneys in the courts. So here did 
the legislature's inadequate appropriation of funds both to 
MCDHH for training and recruitment of interpreters, and to the 
Administrative Office of the Trial Court for adequate payment, 
lead to a similar shortage.203 Thus, the interpreter shortage here is 
distinguishable from the situation in Leno, and instead, analogous 
to Lavallee's shortage of defense attorneys. The shortage of quali­
fied interpreters for the courts that Massachusetts now faces has 
arisen as a result of inadequate funding for an existing legislative 
mandate, and it would therefore not violate the separation of pow­
ers for the court to issue a writ of mandamus. 
201. The legislature cannot solve the problem of the lack of interpreter services 
by repealing the Interpreter Law. Even though the Interpreter Law does not create an 
independent right of action, John Sandoval and his co-plaintiffs could still sue the Com­
monwealth for violation of their constitutional rights, as the indigent defendants did in 
Lavallee. 
202. As evidenced by the lack of success in providing only sporadic trainings, 
MCDHH would need to have a permanent line item in its budget for annual legal inter­
preter trainings in order to increase the pool of interpreters available to meet the 
courts' needs. 
203. In 2004, the minimum standard pay for interpreters for court and legal set­
tings in several states, including Washington, D.C., was approximately $60.00 per hour 
with a four-hour minimum. Informal Survey of Interpreters at the Iron Sharpens Iron 
Conference for Legal Interpreters, in Atlanta, GA (May 2004). In New York, interpret­
ers earn up to $100 per hour. Conversation with Molly Wilson, Court & Legal Inter­
preter, in Modena, NY (Dec. 2006). In Massachusetts, it was $40.00 per hour until 
January 1, 2007. Now it is $200 for half a day (four hours) and $300 for all day (no 
lunch included and regardless of how long the workday goes). Administrative Office 
for the Trial Court Official Time Sheet; Conversations with legal interpreters Joan 
Wattman, Bonnie Kraft, and Carol Fay, regarding why qualified legal interpreters pre­
fer not to work in the courts over the period from 2003 to 2005. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Massachusetts courts have effectively been rendered im­
potent when it comes to dealing with Deaf defendants. Due to the 
severe shortage of legally qualified interpreters for the courts, pro­
ceedings that would otherwise move along for hearing defendants 
are delayed, and sometimes grind to a halt where Deaf defendants 
are concerned. Even though John Sandoval is a hypothetical char­
acter, he represents a composite of what real Deaf defendants suf­
fer. Through their collective nonfeasance, both MCDHH and the 
legislature have impermissibly encroached on the judiciary, inter­
fered with its ability to secure the legal presence of Deaf defendants 
at its proceedings, and thereby violated Deaf defendants' statutory 
and constitutional rights. The court has no choice but to act to safe­
guard its autonomy and its ability to operate timely and efficiently, 
as well as to protect Deaf defendants' rights. Injunctive relief is 
warranted here and judicial precedent supports it. Deaf defend­
ants' rights depend on it. 
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